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10.1  Introduction 
Pensions facilitate labor contracting. They provide an additional in- 
strument beyond wages for attracting, sorting, and motivating workers. 
The key difference from other forms of labor compensation is that pen- 
sions are paid during the last years of one’s life, usually as a contingent 
claim with payments continuing as long as one lives. The late-payment 
feature has the advantage of allowing an individual’s reward to depend 
not only on the present period but also on future experiences. Its disad- 
vantage is that it may hinder a worker’s lifetime allocation of income un- 
less he can trade on well-functioning capital markets. 
The contingent claims feature has obvious risk-spreading advantages. 
However, contingent claims markets are often flawed in that they change 
incentives for individuals to engage in various types of behavior and in- 
duce them to “purchase” inappropriate claims. The problem  of moral 
hazard  is  not  severe here.  Individuals  have quite adequate incentives, 
apart from the pensions they will receive, to increase their survival. Simi- 
larly, problems of adverse selection may be limited, because pensions tend 
to be universal in a workplace, and pension considerations are unlikely to 
be the critical factor in job choices. Moreover, individuals are not likely to 
have substantial information about their life expectancy early in life, at 
the time pension benefits start to be accrued. 
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Given their contingent claims nature, and the fact that they are paid at 
the end of  one’s life, the most direct labor market effect of pensions may 
be on individuals’ retirement decisions. In most pension plans, the per pe- 
riod benefits and expected payouts that a worker receives depend signifi- 
cantly on  the age at which he retires. The central purpose of this analysis is 
to explore the effects of  pensions on retirement decisions and to discuss 
the implications of those effects for policy choice. 
A roadmap to our paper may be of assistance. Section 10.1.1 provides a 
brief description of our major results. Section 10.1.2 explores seven fac- 
tors influencing individuals’ retirement decisions, the factors that moti- 
vate our subsequent formulations. We then provide a capsule overview of 
the historical reasons leading to the introduction of pensions. The section 
concludes with a summary of  the labor market effects apart from retire- 
ment decisions. 
Sections 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4 present our substantive results. Each part 
is  self-contained.  All  results are motivated  by intuition.  When proofs 
seem  complicated,  look  for the intuitive arguments  nuzzling with the 
mathematics. 
Section 10.2 examines the effects of pensions on retirement. Pensions 
are first viewed as forced savings. As such, pensions encourage retire- 
ment; indeed, that is one of their primary purposes. Since it is difficult to 
monitor a worker’s true disutility or work or to make contracts in which 
the worker commits himself to retire, pensions are used to help induce ap- 
propriate retirement behavior. How does the value of “pension savings” 
vary with age? Section 10.2.3 begins this inquiry, taking typical defined 
benefit pension plans-as  revealed in a survey described in the appendix- 
and examining the relationship they produce between retirement age and 
expected benefits. Since individuals who choose to retire at different ages 
may have different (possibly unobservable) characteristics (e.g., how long 
they expect to live), we emphasize the distinction between the actuarial 
treatment of individuals and the actuarial treatment of retirement cohorts. 
Section 10.3 focuses on populations that are heterogeneous with respect 
to such factors as preferences or life expectancy. It explores the design of 
optimal pensions (e.g., the way annual benefits should vary with retire- 
ment age), given heterogeneity. If there are asymmetries of information, a 
second-best outcome in which allocative efficiency tugs against full risk 
spreading must be expected. Again, confusion reigns on the issue of actu- 
arial fairness. We hope to dethrone it just a bit. 
Section 10.4 examines the effects of requiring pension offers to be the 
same among workers with dissimilar preferences, life expectancies, and 
productivity profiles. Social security programs and numerous regulations 
now in effect in the United States encourage or require common struc- 
tures. We show how all workers may lose from such commonality, no mat- 
ter what plan is adopted. 
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10.1.1  Summary of Results 
sults, grouped under three headings. 
Our paper includes several models. We  list here some of the major re- 
Appropriate Retirement (10.2.2) 
1. It is a stylized fact that wages frequently exceed productivity in the 
later periods of work life. Because workers are unable to commit them- 
selves to retire under appropriate circumstances (i.e., when disutility ex- 
ceeds productivity, not wages), they will choose to work too long. Pen- 
sions can be used to force workers to save more than they want to save. 
Since these  excess savings are accessible only  on retirement,  workers 
choose to retire  earlier. In the new  equilibrium, firms can pay higher 
wages, raising the worker’s lifetime expected utility. 
Optimal Pensions with Unmonitorable Information 
(10.2.3, 10.3.1, 10.3.2) 
2. Actuarial treatment of cohorts. Most defined benefit pension plans 
appear to be actuarially unfair to late retirees. However, when workers 
can estimate their life span, those who expect to live longer choose to re- 
tire later and the pattern of actuarial benefit may be reversed. 
3. Actuarial treatment of individuals. The structure of optimal pension 
plans, that is, those that maximize ex ante expected utility, must make it 
actuarially unfavorable for an individual to  retire later. 
4. Disutility unmonitorable. The optimal pension plan when disutility 
of work is unmonitorable offers a benefit that rises with retirement age up 
to a point and is then level. This point, in effect, is the maximum retire- 
ment age. 
The rising portion of the pension curve sacrifices risk spreading to dis- 
courage workers from retiring too early. Under the optimal plan, assum- 
ing that death dates do not correlate with disutility, cohorts that retire 
later receive lower expected pension benefits. 
Common Pension Plan for Heterogeneous Populations (10.4) 
5. Consider the optimal pension plans for each group of workers with 
different characteristics.  If, as required  and encouraged  by  law,  these 
plans are merged, then problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
may make all groups worse off. Indeed there may be no common pension 
plan that is superior for any group of workers to what they each received 
when treated separately. 
10.1.2  Why People Retire 
The purpose of this analysis is to identify the role of pensions in affect- 
ing individuals’ retirement decisions. At the outset, it is important to iden- 
tify why retirement occurs; seven factors play a role in our models. They 286  Barry Nalebuff/Richard J. Zeckhauser 
are (1) decreasing productivity; (2) increasing disutility of  labor; (3) out- 
side employment opportunities; (4) entitlements for retiring, such as pen- 
sions; (5)  information about health and longevity; (6) indivisibility of la- 
bor;  and  (7) declining marginal utility  of  consumption.  The first five 
factors are obviously related to the passage of  time. Were they constant 
over time, and were labor perfectly divisible, there would be no reason to 
retire. Individuals would work the same amount each period. Full divisi- 
bility of labor would lead to scaled-down participation in the labor force 
rather than retirement. Obviously, in many instances labor is divisible at a 
price. One can work part time, but at a less than proportional salary. The 
analysis is simplified by assuming complete indivisibility of labor. 
Given indivisibility of  labor, individuals might  still choose to work 
throughout their lives unless marginal utility from consumption declines. 
Thus, as is standard, individuals are assumed to have a concave period 
utility of consumption (though in some instances, to facilitate exposition, 
marginal utility may be constant). With decreasing productivity  or in- 
creasing disutility of labor as one ages, it will be reasonable for individuals 
to consider retirement toward the end of their lives. If  outside employ- 
ment opportunities decline over time, the date of retirement from a given 
company will be advanced. Retirement patterns from the public employ- 
ment sector illustrate this point; many individuals leave military or civil 
service at a time when they can still get a good outside job offer. 
Entitlements may also be a function of age. Both social security and pri- 
vate pensions are age related. Presumably, individuals make some rough 
calculation of the value to them of the entitlements streams for different 
retirement dates and choose accordingly. A matter of  central concern in 
this analysis is the structure of returns that an individual can expect from 
retirement, the effect that this will have on individual decisions, and ulti- 
mately the structure of the pension plans that will be supportable in a 
competitive marketplace. 
In valuing the entitlements to be received on retirement, a key consider- 
ation is how long the individual expects to live. If working one more year 
yields a 10% increase in the per period benefit, the additional year may be 
a worthwhile sacrifice for a person with a life expectancy of  25 years, but 
not for one with an eight-year life expectancy. 
Though two factors-indivisibility  of labor and declining marginal util- 
ity of consumption-are  in themselves sufficient to explain why individ- 
uals would take periods of leisure in their lives, they do not explain why 
these periods should be at the end of one’s life. This phenomenon is better 
explained by age’s adverse effects on productivity and disutility of  work, 
in conjunction with the important role of uncertainty. The disutility of la- 
bor at later ages is something workers cannot predict accurately at an ear- 
ly age. They also learn more about their longevity as they age. This sug- 
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are the same, it is best to work at the beginning of life and to make deci- 
sions on when to retire later when more information is available. 
10.1.3  Historical Origins of  Private Pensions 
In 1875, the American Express Company established the first formal 
private pension. Only permanently disabled workers who were over 60 
and had worked at least 25 years in the firm were eligible. As a large holder 
of railroad companies, American Express employed workers in danger- 
ous jobs. Many of them, once injured, had no means of supporting them- 
selves; guaranteeing workers an income if disabled made them more likely 
to accept dangerous jobs. By  1905, the railroads had created  12 formal 
plans covering 488,000 workers, or 35%  of all railroad employees. By 
1929, over 80% of all railroad workers were covered by some sort of re- 
tirement plan (Greenough and King 1976). 
Other industries, not all in hazardous fields, also began pension plans, 
and by 1920 almost 400 existed. Companies began to realize the benevo- 
lent and economic consequences of  retirement plans.  Before long, this 
mostly discretionary and nonlegally binding form of  retirement compen- 
sion was seen as a moral obligation of the employer. Corporations wel- 
comed this interpretation, but to become a permanent institution in the 
private sector, pensions had to produce some tangible economic benefits 
to the employer. The employee’s gold watch represented an investment, 
not just a gift. 
Most significantly,  pensions enabled the employer to retire older and in- 
capacitated workers. Previously, employers were forced to adopt such in- 
efficient  alternatives as retaining employees on the payroll at reduced pay, 
reassigning them to less demanding jobs, or offering occasional relief pack- 
ages to particularly needy retirees. By establishing a formal pension plan, 
the employer could remove these workers in an orderly and employee- 
approved fashion without fear of adverse public reaction. When the maxi- 
mum retirement age was fixed, retirement became ingrained as part of 
working  life.  Pensions  allowed the employer to retire  less  productive 
workers while retaining an air of equity and appreciation for a job well 
done. Replacement of these older workers with younger, more agile ones 
would increase labor productivity through the increased efficiency of a 
younger work force. Pension plans thus became an instrument for fostering 
the retirement of older workers with a minimum of employee resistance. 
While the employers emphasized the reward aspect of a pension for 
those actually retiring, the emphasis for the active workers was on earning 
the reward; it encouraged them to give the kind of service that was of 
greatest value to the company. By basing pensions on continuity of em- 
ployment,  business organizations thought they had found a means not 
only of preventing strikes but also of promoting long, loyal, and uninter- 
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mean reduced labor turnover and lower training costs. Thus, pensions not 
only provided  a means of  replacing older workers with  more efficient 
younger ones, they made younger employees more reluctant to quit and 
increased their efficiency; from the employers’ standpoint, the economic 
cost of a pension could be more than offset by the improvement of  labor 
productivity. 
Pensions strengthened the worker’s allegiance to the firm at the expense 
of his loyalty to his union. Employers understood the unions’ dislike of 
these plans and became determined to maintain control over pensions. 
Over 95% of the workers covered by pension plans paid nothing into the 
scheme. By not requiring worker contributions and making the benefits 
discretionary, management could bar unions from involvement in retire- 
ment policy and set the requirements themselves. As a result, employers 
gained considerable leverage over employees’ work decisions. The effect, 
it was hoped, would be a reduction in strikes and a weakening of union 
appeal.  I 
10.1.4  Pensions and Labor Market Performance 
Many economic factors contributed to the historical development of 
pensions. Feldstein (1982, p. 1) identifies the myopia argument for forcing 
workers to protect themselves for old age when their productivity will be 
lower. Moreover, since pensions can be a means of backloading compen- 
sation, they may be an important factor in rewarding, motivating, and ty- 
ing workers to firms. By  delaying rewards, the firm can better deal with 
uncertainty that is resolved over time. As information on worker’s effort 
level or productivity  accumulates, the firm discovers how much to pay 
him. Many of the standard adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
disappear as the time span becomes sufficiently long (assuming that there 
is no efficiency cost to withholding earlier rewards). 
Pensions have considerable advantages as a delayed reward  mecha- 
nism. In contrast to wages that rise faster than productivity, pensions real- 
locate resources to a time period to which the individual himself wishes to 
reallocate resources. There is, of course, a limit on the amount that can be 
efficiently reallocated to the retirement period.  Until this constraint be- 
comes binding,  pensions need  not entail any efficiency loss. In this re- 
spect, they differ from other common means of withholding or backload- 
ing rewards, such as wage streams that rise faster than productivity or big 
prizes in contests (promotion lotteries). The function of pensions as a re- 
ward and motivational mechanism is widely cited in relation to retention 
of  workers. But pensions may also come to play a significant role in sort- 
ing workers by quality and motivating them. 
Many market imperfections may be mitigated through the use of  pen- 
sions. For example, the firm may be able to invest at a greater rate of re- 
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costs in raising funds. If some funds are left for the firm to invest through 
pensions, both parties gain. In general, this analysis looks at the benefits 
that go to the worker and firm together. The predominant prediction is 
that possible efficiencies will be pursued. 
Pensions have a straightforward tax benefit as a form of compensation. 
They are not taxed at the time they are earned, and returns to these invest- 
ments are not taxed along the way.  In any single instance, it is a complex 
problem to figure out the precise trade-off between a dollar of  pension 
and a dollar of  compensation. But virtually all analyses agree that under 
current tax provisions it is desirable to use some element of  pensions as 
part of the wage package (see Woodbury 1983). 
Why should the government be promoting the use of pensions in this 
way? In the 1980s, some might say that the problem for our economy is in- 
sufficient capital formation. Government favoritism for pensions stretch- 
es back to periods when it was thought that insufficient consumption in 
the economy was the predominant problem. One possible explanation is 
that pensions tend to protect the government, much as flood insurance 
and health insurance-both  subsidized-protect  it. If  people reach old 
age without a visible means of  support, the government will be forced to 
support them.’ 
10.2  Pensions and Retirement 
We have argued that pensions serve several functions distinct from their 
effects on retirement. This suggests that pension plans will remain part of 
our economy, inevitably affecting retirement, conceivably in an adverse 
fashion. As we observe pension plans in operation, it may be difficult to 
determine their intended  consequences for retirement, since they serve 
multiple purposes. Moreover, we may not be able to tell whether their de- 
sign is optimal. At some junctures, we  will discuss the form of optimal 
pension plans given retirement objectives, stripping away other concerns. 
We  shall also make predictions about the consequences of pensions that 
have traditional structures on workers’ retirement decisions. 
Why should pensions be used to affect retirement? A variety of reasons 
are identified in the models below.  They center on problems stemming 
from an inability to make enforceable contracts. Firms typically do not 
reduce a worker’s wages as he grows older, even though his productivity 
declines. If productivity could be predicted as a function of age, then in 
the first-best contract, the worker would agree in advance to retire at a 
particular age and the firm would offer a level wage over his lifetime. 
Even in this simplified world, where critical uncertainties about the evolu- 
tion of productivity have been eliminated, present regulatory structures 
would make such contracting impossible. Congress recently raised the 
mandatory retirement age to 70.  In March 1983, such “protection”  was 290  Barry Nalebuff/Richard J. Zeckhauser 
accorded as well to state and local workers. There is some speculation that 
prohibitions on mandatory retirement will be further relaxed. 
Many firms have discovered that the best way to guard against having 
to keep low-productivity workers on the payroll is to offer them pension 
inducements to  depart. Such inducements are also in the interest of work- 
ers, who would otherwise not be in a position to “promise” to  retire. 
Pensions  play a second major role vis-a-vis retirement by spreading 
risks in heterogeneous  populations.  Suppose productivity and earnings 
were constant, but individuals come to differ over time in their disutility 
for work. The critical policy issue is how to induce those with low disutil- 
ity to continue working while providing adequately for those who, say for 
reasons of ill health, are unable to  continue productive endeavors or could 
do so only at unacceptable cost. 
The analysis here focuses on these two concerns: inducing appropriate 
retirement  and spreading risks  associated  with  factors affecting  retire- 
ment. In past discussion of these issues, much has been made of the ques- 
tion of the actuarial fairness of  pension plans.  Such fairness is likely to 
turn out to  be a legal issue as well as an  economic one. We believe that ac- 
tuarial fairness is an elusive concept, and we discuss several different po- 
tential definitions. No single concept of actuarial fairness does a good job 
of capturing what we should expect from pension plans across a variety of 
situations. 
10.2.1  The Retirement  Decision 
As a worker ages, several factors become important in influencing his 
decision to retire. Savings and pension entitlements grow with work ten- 
ure; this raises the level of sustainable consumption during retirement. 
This increase in consumption  is further enhanced by the fact that addi- 
tional work shortens the retirement period. The disutility from work also 
rises as the worker ages and his health deterioriates. Eventually, produc- 
tivity and outside opportunities decline, although real wages may not fall 
to reflect this fact. Near retirement, workers have a more accurate idea of 
their life expectancy. They are better able to compare the trade-off be- 
tween working and retirement.  Other issues,  such as the presumed im- 
provement in the quality of life and increased longevity from retirement, 
are also important when making the retirement decision. 
The incentives to retire increase with age. The main factors influencing 
retirement are shown in figure 10.1. Here L(R)  = disutility of work at age 
R; W(R)  = wage at R;  C@) = retirement consumption given retirement 
at age R;  F(R) = productivity at age R. 
The individual should continue working until the utility of working plus 
the higher retirement consumption it affords falls short of the utility of re- 




10.2.2  Savings and Appropriate Retirement 
The decision to retire is based largely on a worker’s postretirement in- 
come and his perceived health and life expectancy. Workers with sufficient 
foresight can save for themselves. Alternatively, their employer can pro- 
vide forced savings as part of the total compensation package. In the sec- 
ond-best world of labor contracting, it is not always advantageous for 
workers to have the option of choosing their level of savings. When a 
worker cannot commit himself to retire at the optimal age, pensions can 
induce him to retire earlier. By forcing a worker to save too much, pen- 
sions offset the externality created by the fact that wages do not fall dur- 
ing an older employee’s less productive years. 
Firms base wages on the expected productivity of a worker over his life- 
time with the firm. The wage schedule is decided in advance and is based 
on a worker’s expected retirement age. Given the schedule, the worker is 
then free to  choose when to  retire. But, his actions must be consistent with 
what the firm expected him to  do. 
Because wages stay constant over a worker’s lifetime, he will not have 
sufficient incentives to retire when productivity is declining. Laws against 
mandatory retirement prohibit contractual agreements to retire at a pre- 
specified  age,  and  firms  realize  that, without  a  binding  commitment, 
workers  will  delay their  retirement.  Accordingly,  they  reduce  lifetime 
wages to compensate for the period of high wages and low productivity 
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Pensions help solve this problem by providing economic incentives to 
retire at an earlier age.3  Pensions put aside higher savings than the worker 
would choose and make them accessible only on retirement. They provide 
the counterbalance that speeds up retirement that otherwise would be sub- 
optimally delayed by wages higher than productivity. 
Under any given wage schedule, an employee would be better off if he 
could select both his savings and his retirement age. But the same wage 
schedules are then not  feasible. Workers who feel that they are being 
forced to save too much are not attracted by contracts without pensions 
because the freedom to save is more than offset by the resulting lower 
wages (due to employer’s inability to induce retirement). 
We  illustrate this use of pensions in a simple model in which workers 
care only about consumption and leisure. They start with a firm at age YO 
and stay with the firm until they retire at age R. Wages are constant and 
equal to expected productivity. A worker of  age Y has productivity F( Y). 
The risk-neutral employer, if he is to attract any workers in a competitive 
equilibrium, must maximize his workers’ expected utilities subject to the 
zero profit constraint. Initially, we  assume that the discount rate is zero 
for both workers and  firm^,^ and that everyone knows his exact life span. 
The results can be extended to include positive discounting and uncertain 
life expectancy under the assumption that perfect annuity markets exist. 
The worker’s period utility is represented by U(C,  L), 
(1)  awe,  L)/X>O; dZU(C, L)/dC?<O;  dU(C,  L)/dL<O, 
where C is consumption and L is labor supply. Institutional requirements 
force the labor supply to be either 1  or 0. The age-productivity profile is 
assumed first to rise as the worker gains experience and eventually to fall if 
the worker stays past a sufficiently old age. 
It is optimal for consumption levels to be constant, given the labor sup- 
ply, as there is declining marginal utility from consumption. The worker 
chooses his consumption while employed, CI,  and his consumption when 
retired, CZ.  Since both wages and consumption (while working) are con- 
stant, savings will also be a constant fraction, a,  of salary. The retirement 
decision, R,  is constrained by the condition that savings must be sufficient 
to meet the cost of the expected retirement consumption. Total lifetime 
utility is given by 
Consumption is financed out of earnings and savings. The budget con- 
straint for a worker earning wage Wcan be separated into two parts, work 
life and retirement. When working, his consumption is by definition equal 
to his salary net of savings, 
(3)  c1  = W(1 -  a). 293  Pensions and the Retirement Decision 
The retirement  age and postretirement  consumption are jointly  deter- 
mined. Given a desired level of postretirement consumption, a worker re- 
tires when his accumulated savings are sufficient to finance his consump- 
tion. For a worker who knows that his life span is exactly T years, this 
implies: 
(4)  Wa(R - Yo) = (T-  R)Cz. 
A worker’s lifetime wage is based on his expected productivity, 
(5) 
= [  yoF(Y)dY  1  /(R - yo). 
Assuming competitive conditions, a firm knowing a worker’s R would of- 
fer him the wage defined by (5). If the worker could commit himself to re- 
tire at a prespecified time, he would select R to maximize his utility, taking 
into account the effect on his wages of postponing retirement.  (If there 
were uncertainties to unfold in the future, he would make contingent re- 
tirement commitments contingent on his condition.) 
Unfortunately, a worker cannot commit himself to retire at a prespeci- 
fied age. His wages must be determined in advance, and independently 
from his actual retirement  decision. Moreover, if  productivity  declines 
later in life, as is commonly the case, wages are likely to exceed productiv- 
ity. A worker deciding on retirement will equate marginal disutility with 
wage,  whereas efficiency requires that it be equated with productivity. 
This constellation of factors creates an inefficient situation. Workers, un- 
able to commit themselves in advance to a retirement date, will choose to 
retire “too late.” 
The firm meets its zero profit constraint by choosing wages based on 
when it expects its employees to retire. These assumptions must be consis- 
tent with the optimal retirement age given the chosen wages. Given a fixed 
wage W,  a worker chooses C1  and Cz to maximize his lifetime utility sub- 
ject to (3) and (4). The Lagrangian may be written as 294  Barry Nalebuff/Richard J. Zeckhauser 
The equations may be combined to provide two first-order conditions 
that are more intuitive: 
(1 1)  UdCI, E) = UI(C2, 01, 
U(C2,O) - U(C1,  L) 
wa + cz 
UI(C2,O)  = 
Because there are perfect capital markets, resources will be transferred 
from the work period to the retirement period until the marginal utilities 
of consumption are equalized. Working longer brings an extra Wa + C2 
in savings. This must be balanced by the loss in utility from delaying re- 
tirement. 
The optimal solution is determined by jointly solving equations (3), (4), 
(lo), (ll), and (5); this yields C?,  C?,  a*,  R*,  and the resulting W.  If, at 
the retirement age, wages are more than productivity, F(R*) > U:  then 
workers will have incentives to work for an inefficiently long time. The 
firm can partially correct this problem by forcing workers to save more.5 
In theorem 1, forced saving is shown to induce earlier retirement, and this 
results in higher wages. 
Since Cl, C2, a,  and R are all chosen optimally, small changes in their 
values will not directly affect expected utility. The only way to improve ex- 
pected utility is to be able to support higher wages, 
dEU  - aEU  dC1  aEU  dC2  ~  +-- 
dW  aCl  dW  aC2  dW 
aEU  da  aEU  dR  aEU  +--+-  --  aa  dw  aR  dw  aw 
= X(l -  a)  + pa(R - Yo) 
= Ui(C1,  L)(R - Yo) >O. 
In equilibrium, as determined by equation (9,  the wage rate is a function 
of the retirement age and productivity, 
(14) 
dW  - F(R) - W 
dR  R-Yo  . 
-- 
Theorem 1  :  Under the assumption that F(R)  < W,  increasing the sav- 
ings rate, a,  above a*  improves expected utility, (dEU/dala*)  > 0. 
Proofi From the assumptions of the theorem, earlier retirement raises 
wages, (dW/dR)  < 0. Higher wages improve expected utility (eq. [13]). 
Thus, it only needs to be demonstrated that raising a  hastens retirement. 
This part of the proof is longer and more complicated. Differentiating the 
budget constraints (3) and (4) shows 
--  dCI  (1 -  a)=  + w = 0, 
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a(T-R)-(wol+C~)--a(R-  dR  YO)--  dW  W(R - YO)  = 0. 
da  da  da 
As Wis affected by a only through R, we use equation (14) to substitute 
dW  dR 
da  da 
a[R - Yo] -  = a[W-  F(R)] - 
into equation (16).Collecting terms, rewrite equation (16) as 
(16’)  -[aF(R)  dR  + C2] = -(T-  dcz  R) - W(R - YO). 
da  doc 
To determine dCz/da,  differentiate equation (12), 
Note from equation (11) that Ul(CI,  L) = U1(Cz,  0). Thus, substitute the 
value of dCl/da  from (15) and collect terms, 
where A  = -  UII(C~,O)/  Ul(Cz,  0) is the measure of absolute risk aver- 
sion. It is now possible to sign dR/da  using (16’), (19) and (4), 
c  0.  dR -  -  W(R - Yo) 
doc 
(20) -  - 
&(R)  + Cz  + Wa[  W -  F(R)]/[Cz(  WO~  + Cz)A] 
Changes in a  affect expected utility only through changes in W.  The argu- 
ment above demonstrates that when savings are “too high,” retirement 
takes place earlier, wages are higher, and workers are better off. Essential- 
ly, when choosing a*  and R*, workers neglect the impact on their wages. 
This externality is reduced if the firm chooses a > a*;  the worker is in- 
duced to retire earlier and expected utility increases. 
If  firms are providing pensions that are larger than workers’ desired 
savings, then why do we observe any private savings taking place? Savings 
in the form of pensions is not a perfect substitute for other types of sav- 
ings. In particular, since pensions are accessible only on retirement after 
the age of 55,  they cannot provide capital needed for large purchases (such 
as a house) or insurance against preretirement events such as illness or un- 
employment. Some forms of savings outside of pensions-notably  invest- 
ment in home ownership-are  encouraged and subsidized by the govern- 
ment. The value of their house, net of mortgage, forms the largest part of 
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10.2.3  Life Expectancy and Retirement-Who  Gains, Who Loses 
A major role of pensions is to  induce workers to retire. This role will be- 
come even more important if the current movement against mandatory re- 
tirement succeeds. Pensions may provide economic incentives to retire in 
two significant ways: (1) pensions provide savings that can be accessed 
only during retirement; (2) pensions may not be actuarially fair to  workers 
who retire after normal retirement age. The forced savings role of  pen- 
sions is discussed in the previous section. This section concentrates on the 
actuarial value of the pension as a function of the retirement date. 
Workers in their later years earn wages greater than their productivity 
and thus have incentives to work after their first-best retirement date. La- 
zear (in this vol.) argues that it is possible to  correct for this externality by 
reducing the actuarial value of pensions to workers who postpone retire- 
ment. Changing the compensation through pensions is a graceful way to 
lower the “effective” wage (salary plus pension value) and restore incen- 
tives to  retire early. 
A first look at the data seems to confirm this observation (see the ap- 
pendix). Most defined benefit plans reduce benefits only by 4%-6% for 
each year of early retirement (before age 65). For workers retiring after 
65, pensions are generally not increased (except to take account of  extra 
years of service). If all workers had identically distributed life spans, then, 
as illustrated in the model below, an actuarially fair benefit reduction for 
early retirement would be close to 9.5% and benefits would be similarly 
increased for late retirement.6 This significantly larger factor reflects the 
fact that early retirement gives an extra year of benefits now; the costs oc- 
cur over a discounted and uncertain future and are proportionally less 
important. 
Consider a worker with pension P per year that is reduced (increased) 
by fraction b for each year of early (late) retirement. Workers know only 
the probability distribution of their death date. The real discount rate is 
3%.’ No retirement is allowed before age 55. At age 55, a worker’s chance 
of living until age 55 + r is C(r).  With a uniform distribution of life spans 
between 55 and 90, G(r)  = 1 -  r/35.  The equality defining an actuarially 
fair adjustment for retirement at age 55 + r - 1 is 
(21)  [l -  b(r)]P 13’  e-.03‘(l - t/35)dt  = P jr  e-.03‘(l - t/35)dt 
This implies 
(22) 
At age 65, r = 10 and the appropriate penalty for early retirement is 
(23)  b(r) = [(33.3t - 55.5)e-.03‘160]/[(33.3t  -  55.5)e-.03f1;5]  = .095. 
Results above suggest that with most penalties smaller than 6% per year 
of early retirement (and no bonus for late retirement), workers who retire 




b(r) j35  e-.03‘(35 - t)dt = jr  - le-.03‘(35 -  t)dt. 
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Appearances may be deceiving. When workers have different life spans 
and know these differences, then the decision about when to retire is high- 
ly correlated with age. Workers who know that they have relatively longer 
life spans work later into their life. The literature of gerontology suggests 
that workers who retire early have shorter life spans. For example, the 
work of Haynes et al. (1979) demonstrates that the mortality rate of early 
retirees is higher than would be expected if no self-selection were occur- 
ring. 
The fact that pensions do not seem to rise very fast with retirement age 
may reflect the different life expectancies for the different retiring  age 
groups. Indeed, given the structure and parameters of most defined bene- 
fit plans, workers who postpone retirement receive relatively more bene- 
fits than those who retire earlier. Otherwise there would be a severe prob- 
lem of  adverse selection. If workers who retire early were given larger 
benefits to compensate them for their shorter life expectancy, then work- 
ers with long life expectancies would also retire early.*  The pension plan 
could not afford to pay pensions based on short life expectancies to work- 
ers with long life spans who retire early.9 The model presented  below 
shows that workers who retire early are actuarially penalized in a typical 
defined benefit pension plan. This may be necessary to give workers with 
longer life expectancies sufficient incentives to remain in the labor force. 
The typical defined benefit pension plan has payments proportional to 
a function of wages10  multiplied by years of service with a multiplicative 
linear penalty for early retirement. A worker entering at age YO and retir- 
ing at R receives an annual pension 
&F(W)[R  - Yo][l  + (R -  R)p],  Y I  R,  I &F(W)[R  - Yo],  Y>R. 
(24)  P(R)  = 
When a firm can choose the fraction of wages,&, normal retirement date, 
w,  and the early retirement penalty, 0,  then the pension payment for re- 
tirement before age Rcan be written as a general quadratic function of R, 
(25)  P(R)  = A(R2  + BR + C) 
whereA  = -  &F(W)p; B = [l -  p(R + Yo)]/O;  C = Yo(RP - l)/O. 
The pension payment for retirement after age R is a linear function of R 
as seen in equation (24). There is some loss in generality when wages are 
not also a function of  retirement age and seniority. However, at least for 
pattern plans, F( W) is a constant and this effect is unimportant. At pre- 
sent, we are concerned with demonstrating the effect of life span on retire- 
ment decisions and the actuarial value of pensions, and hence assume that 
wages and productivity are constant over the life span. Wages are not af- 
fected by the retirement date. The discount rate is zero and conditional on 
the labor supply, the marginal utility of consumption is constant. Thus, 
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A worker who knows that his life span will be exactly T years and who 
faces a pension schedule, P(R),  chooses his retirement age R to  maximize 
his expected lifetime utility. 
(26)  EU = U[(1 -  CY)~  L](R  - Yo) + U[P(R),  O](T -  R). 
The first-order condition determining the optimal retirement date is 
(27)  P’(R)(T -  R)Ui[P(R), 0]  = U[P(R),  0] - U[(1 -  CY)~  L]. 
For retirement prior to age R this equation can be solved explicitly for R as 
a function of T under the earlier assumption of a quadratic pension plan 
and constant marginal utility of consumption, 
(28)  (2AR + AB)(T -  R)Ul(O,  0) = A(R2  + BR + C)Ul(O,  0) 
-  (1 - a)WU1(0,  1)  + U(0,O) - U(0,E). 
Let y equal the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption when retired 
to when employed, y = UI(O,  O)/UI(O,  1).  Define L‘  as the disutility from 
work measured in wage units,  [U(O,  0) - U(0,  Z)]/U,(O,  0).  Then, (28) 
can be reduced to 
R(T)  = -  T -  B + .J 72 + B2 + TB -  3{C + [L  -  (1 -  w)Wy]/A}) 
For retirement after age a,  pension benefits rise linearly with age. The 
optimal retirement date as a function of life span is 
(30) 
Usually, there will be some overlap among these solutions; during this pe- 
riod all workers choose to retire at age l?. A small difference in the mar- 
ginal incentives for retirement before versus after l? may induce a large 
segment of the work force to retire at R. 
To illustrate an example of the optimal retirement decisions, let pension 
benefits be 1.5% of net wages for each year of service with a 5% reduction 
for each year of early retirement before age 65:& = .015,p = .05, F( W) = 
(1 -  a)W,  andl? = 65. The disutility from work is .57 W.  Saving 14% of 
wages balances the budget when population life spans are triangularly dis- 
tributed between ages 59 and 88. The solution to the optimal retirement 
decision is graphed below in figure 10.2, 
Who wins and who loses? The value of a pension to a worker with life 
span T is 
(29)  3  ( 
1 
2 
R(T)  = -  {T  + Yo  + [(l -  CY)~  -  L]/[&F(W)]}. 
(31)  V(T)  = P[R(T)][T  -  R(T)I - aWIR(T) - Yo)]. 
Living longer changes this value by 
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Fig. 10.2  Retirement age as a function of  life span. 
where P'(R)  was substituted in from equation (27). Workers who live 
longer have greater pension benefits provided that their replacement ra- 
tio, P/ w,  exceeds their incremental time in the labor force, R' ,  times the 
net dollar value of working,  1 - L/ W.  In the example presented above, 
pension value strictly increases with life span (and hence retirement age) 
as illustrated in figure 10.3. 
10.3  Optimal Pensions with Heterogeneous Populations 
What are the consequences of offering a single pension plan to  a hetero- 
geneous population? Models in various areas, ranging from insurance 
markets to health coverage to labor contracting, have shown that impor- 
tant problems arise when a single policy is applied to a heterogeneous pop- 
ulation. Pensions in some sense combine elements of all of these models. 
Heterogeneity would pose no difficulty if it could be readily diagnosed 
and if different policies could be offered to workers with different charac- 
teristics. Such screening is impossible in practice for a variety of  reasons. 
The differences  among workers may be imperceptible to the employer. 
Moreover, the pension contract is generally drawn up long before many of 
the differentiating characteristics manifest themselves to anyone, includ- 
ing the worker.  It would be a violation of the earlier contract to exclude 
any worker from a pension option."  Legal restrictions and general labor 
practices  make it  exceedingly  difficult  to afford  different treatment to 
workers who, despite differences in some present characteristics, have the 
same employment histories. Unless pensions are negotiated through col- 300  Barry Nalebuff/Richard  J. Zeckhauser 
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Fig. 10.3  Net actuarial value as a function of  death date. 
lective  bargaining,  corporations are prohibited  from offering  different 
pensions to different classes of workers. Thus, a corporation is not per- 
mitted to have different pension  plans for white-collar  and blue-collar 
workers. 
10.3.1  The Order of Retirement 
The decision to retire is determined  by  many  factors;  the following 
models focus on the role of life expectancy and disutility from work. All 
other things equal, workers who live longer or who enjoy work more will 
choose to retire later. This result is true for any pension plan whose annual 
payments do  not decrease with retirement age. 
Consider workers of type i = (A,B)  who enter the labor force at age Y, 
and retire at age Ri  with pension P(Ri)  and life expectancy 7;.  Utility when 
employed is U(C,  i) and when retired is U[P(Ri),O].  Assume that it is opti- 
mal for A to  retire before B,  RA  < RE.  Because A retires earlier, his annual 
pension payment is smaller, P(RA)  < P(RB). 
Theorem 2:  Under the assumptions stated above, worker B,  who retires 
later, must have either a longer life expectancy, a greater utility when em- 
ployed, or both. 
Pro08 The fact that each worker prefers his retirement date implies 
U[P(RA),  o](E  -  RA) + U((cA, A)(RA - YA) 
2  U[P(RE),  o](TA -  RB)  U(CA,  A)(RE  - YA),  (33) 301  Pensions and the Retirement Decision 
U[P(&), O](TB  -  RE)  + ~(CE,  B)(& - YE) 
2  U[P(RB),  o](TB -  RA) + U(CBj B)(RA - YE).  (34) 
Adding these inequalities together yields 
(35)  (RA -  RB)[U(CB,  B) - ~(CA,  A)] 
2  { U[P(RB),  01 - U[P(RA),  O])(T4 - TB). 
Any contradiction to the theorem would require the worker who retires 
earlier to have both a longer expected life span and greater utility from 
work,  TA > TB  and U(CA,  A) > U(CE,  B). However, this must violate 
equation (35). 
10.3.2  The Costs of  Postponing Retirement under Optimal Pensions 
If two groups differ in terms of either length of life or utility from work, 
one group will always retire before the other. This no-switching property 
results more generally when the indifference curves of different groups 
have a single crossing point (SCP).  This seems to be an especially reason- 
able assumption in the context of retirement decisions. We further assume 
that all workers have the same utility function when retired. There is nei- 
ther reemployment nor outside income once retired. Moreover, given that 
retirement is preferable to working, the schedule of  annual pension pay- 
ments must be increasing with age, otherwise workers would retire earlier. 
The higher annual pension payments to workers who retire later imply 
that they have a lower marginal utility of consumption. 
Here we shall seek the optimal pension scheme; it is the benefit schedule 
that maximizes the sum of the individuals’ utilities subject to a budget 
constraint. A salient feature of the optimal pension schedule is that it is 
actuarially unfavorable for a specified individual to retire later. The logic 
supporting this result parallels that in the optimal taxation literature: it is 
desirable to tax those with lower marginal utilities of income (penalize late 
retirees in this instance) to redistribute income to those with higher mar- 
ginal utility of income (early retirees). At least initially, efficiency loss as- 
sociated  with  inappropriately  influencing  work  or  retirement  are 
outweighed by the utility gains from the income transfer. This result is for- 
malized in theorem 3. 
Theorem 3: The SCP property is sufficient to imply that with the opti- 
mal pension scheme, the value of  pensions plus wages net of productivity 
must be actuarially larger for a worker who chooses to retire earlier; that 
is, any particular worker who retires earlier will receive pensions plus total 
wages (net of productivity) with a higher actuarial value. 
Comment: It is still possible that the type of workers who choose to re- 
tire earlier may be the ones with lower pensions; indeed, as seen in section 
10.2.3, current pension plans actuarially favor later retirees. Thus, in the 
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ences in the actuarial value of a particular worker’s pension based on his 
decision when to retire (individual fairness) and the differences between 
the actuarial value of a pension for different types of workers (cohort fair- 
ness). It is also important to maintain the assumption that reemployment 
once retired is not permitted; otherwise, workers would retire if their pen- 
sion value began to decline and then seek reemployment. 
Proo) In the proof, we take productivity and wages as given; pensions 
are adjusted to achieve the result. The firm offers the worker a choice be- 
tween  various  retirement  dates  and  their  associated  pension  benefit, 
[R,P(R)].  The first part of the proof demonstrates that each worker must 
be indifferent between his retirement date and the one preceding his. Giv- 
en indifference, earlier retirement is shown to cost the firm more. Intu- 
itively the optimal pension scheme will distribute the largest feasible bene- 
fits to workers retiring early since they receive the lowest payment and 
thus have the highest marginal utility of income. Because early retirees’ 
pensions are maximized, late retirees will be pushed to the point of indif- 
ference between their chosen retirement date and retiring earlier. Howev- 
er, if the late retirement benefit had a higher actuarial value, the pension 
plan could improve welfare by eliminating the expensive option; the late 
retiree is indifferent to retiring earlier so that his utility is the same but the 
total cost to the firm is smaller. 
Consider the first worker to retire who strictly prefers his retirement 
date to the one preceding his. This is the case with worker C illustrated in 
figure 10.4. Lower his pension and raise the benefits for worker B. Since C 
strictly preferred retiring at RC  rather than Re, it is possible to raise P(RB) 
and lower P(Rc)  without inducing C to retire earlier. Raising P(RB)  does 
not result in A’s retiring later because A must strictly prefer retiring at Ra 
to RB.  This strict preference follows from the single crossing property and 
the fact that B is indifferent between retiring at RA  and RB  (as C  was the 
first worker to strictly prefer his retirement date over the preceding one). 
By transferring money from worker C to B, social welfare is improved; 
worker B has a smaller pension and thus a higher marginal utility of  in- 
come.  An optimal pension scheme must  make workers indifferent be- 
tween their retirement date and the preceding retirement date. 
Since workers are indifferent between their chosen retirement date and 
the preceding one, it directly follows that the later (and chosen) retirement 
date must have a lower total cost to the firm. If not, simply eliminate the 
later retirement date. The worker then takes the earlier retirement; he is 
indifferent. His utility remains constant, but the total cost to the pension 
fund is smaller. The excess profits can be redistributed to make everyone 
better off. 
This result holds for a broad range of problems.  Workers may have 
varying life spans, differing disutilities from work, and unequal produc- 
tivities. However, in all these problems the marginal utility of income is a 303  Pensions and the Retirement Decision 
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decreasing function of  retirement age; workers who retire later receive 
larger pension payments and thus have smaller marginal utilities of in- 
come. The theorem would be reversed if  the marginal utility of income 
rose as a function of  retirement age; then, the value of pension payments 
plus wages net of  productivity would be more than actuarially fair for 
workers who delayed their retirement. This situation might occur if  the 
primary difference among individuals is outside income. If those who re- 
tire early are the ones with high outside income and thus low marginal util- 
ity of income, then the optimal pension scheme (plus wages net of produc- 
tivity) must be actuarially advantageous to a worker who chooses to  retire 
later. Theorem 3 has a simple generalization. 
Theorem 3 ’ :  The SCP property is sufficient to imply that with the opti- 
mal pension scheme, the value of pensions plus wages net of productivity 
must be actuarially larger for a worker who chooses to retire earlier (later) 
if marginal utility of consumption decreases (increases) with retirement 
age. 
The proof for theorem 3’ needs only one small modification to incor- 
porate the generalization that the marginal utility of consumption may in- 
crease with retirement age. In this case, workers will all be indifferent be- 
tween their retirement date and the following one. The earlier retirement 
date cannot be more expensive as otherwise it will be eliminated. 
An illustration of theorem 3, that is, when marginal utility of income 
declines with retirement age, is presented in the following section. 304  Barry NalebuWRichard J. Zeckhauser 
10.3.3  Disutility and Optimal Pension Design 
Disutility of work generally increases with age. Given institutional con- 
straints against shortened work weeks, eventually the disutility of labor 
becomes large enough to induce retirement (see, e.g., Hausman and Wise 
in this vol.). Workers would like to be able to insure themselves against 
prematurely having a high disutility from work. This problem is most se- 
vere when the worker is actually disabled and can no longer work. A dis- 
ability is an  extreme form of disutility from work. To illustrate an applica- 
tion of theorem  3, this section presents a simplified version of a model 
initially studied by  Diamond and Mirrlees (1978). Pensions are used to 
support  disabled workers,  an extreme case that  simplifies exposition. 
Qualitatively these results apply to the range of situations where the deci- 
sion to retire is based on the level of disutility from work. 
Pensions, as they were originally conceived, can be viewed as insurance 
to workers who are disabled and forced to retire (or have high disutility 
and would choose to do so). However, a problem arises when the disabil- 
ity is not observable or verifiable. Healthy workers must have sufficient 
incentives to continue working. Consequently, less insurance is provided 
than in the first-best solution when the disability is observable. Insurance 
can still be provided to workers who can prove that they are disabled- 
witness the separate provisions for early retirement with certain restricted 
and verifiable disabilities. 
To highlight the insurance feature of pensions, let the disability affect 
neither  the utility  of  consumption nor  the  worker's  life expectan~y.'~ 
There may be some exogenous utility loss but, effectively, the disability 
simply forces the worker to retire. It is easiest to  imagine that the disutility 
from labor is initially zero and becomes infinite if  the worker remains in 
the labor force after he is disabled. 
In a first-best contract, pensions are conditional on the worker becom- 
ing disabled and there is no problem of  adverse selection. Disabilities oc- 
cur stochastically. Pensions should be constant, independent of the retire- 
ment date. This is demonstrated below. 
Let utility from income Y be U(Y),  whether working or not. The dis- 
count rate is zero. The disability takes place at age R with probability dis- 
tribution h(R)  and is verifiable. Workers all have a life expectancy of  ex- 
actly T years. The savings and contributions to pensions have previously 
taken place; there is a fixed amount of savings, S, available to fund the 
pension scheme (and no other private savings are allowed). While work- 
ing, employees are given their constant marginal product, W.  The optimal 
pension payment, P*(R),  is constant and independent of the retirement 
date. There is, however, a maximum retirement date, R. Even workers 
who are healthy should retire by R in order to receive some benefit from 
the pension savings. A worker's utility is maximized subject to the con- 
straint that the expected pension payout equal the pension savings, 305  Pensions and the Retirement Decision 
+ h  f s - EP(R)(T  -  R)h(R)dR -  P(R^)(T  -  R)[l -  H(RI)]} 
The first-order conditions are 
(37) 
(38) 
U’  [P(R)](T  -  R)h(R) - h(T -  R)h(R) = 0 
-+  U’[P(R)]  = A, 
{U(w> - U[P(f)]}[f  -  H(R^)J  + W(R)[l  -  H(R)J  = 0. 
Together they imply that the pension is constant and 
(39) 
Depending on the level of savings, S, there are three possible solutions 
to the first-order conditions. The maximum retirement date is chosen to 
make the constant pension, P(@),  affordable. If this is possible, the level 
of pensions does not depend on the amount of pension savings. As the 
savings become larger, the maximum retirement date is simply shifted for- 
ward. It is conceivable that the savings are sufficiently small that P(&)  is 
never affordable; then, there is no maximum retirement date (R = 7‘) and 
the pension payments are just large enough to exhaust the budget, P = 
S/(T -  R)  where R is the expectation of the disability date. At the other 
less realistic extreme, when savings are larger than needed to finance P@), 
everyone retires immediately and the savings are equally distributed, P  = 
S/(T - Yo). 
It is impossible to provide the same constant pension scheme when dis- 
abilities are not verifiable. All workers would choose to retire at the earli- 
est possible age. The problem is then to give high pensions to workers who 
are disabled at a young age without inducing other healthy workers to re- 
tire. The optimal second-best solution is obtained when the feasible pen- 
sion for the youngest disabled worker is maximized. As seen in the first- 
best  solution, the ideal pension is  equal for all workers.  When pension 
payments are unequal, welfare can be improved by transferring pension 
wealth from workers who receive high payments to workers who receive 
lower payments. The problem of adverse selection results in workers who 
are disabled young receiving the lowest pension. To the extent that it is 
feasible (in terms of both the budget constraint and the self-selection con- 
straint) to raise the payments to young disabled workers, welfare is im- 
proved. 
In the constrained optimal solution, a healthy worker must be indiffer- 
ent between retiring and working (as proven in Diamond and Mirrlees 
[  19781).  This holds if pension benefits satisfy the relationship, 
(40) 
U[P(R)]  - U(w)  = U’[P(R)]P(R). 
U(w) - U[P(R)]  + U’ [P(R)]P’(R)(T  -  R) = 0. 306  Barry Nalebuff/Richard J. Zeckhauser 
This differential equation determines the minimum increase in pensions 
with retirement age necessary to  prevent healthy workers from pretending 
that they are disabled. Under this formulation, a worker’s retirement age 
is a matter of indifference, and a worker is assumed to continue working 
until he becomes disabled. Because of the indifference to retirement date, 
utility at the time of retirement when disabled is identical to the utility at 
the minimum retirement  date,'"^, with pension P(Ro), 
U(W)(R  - Yo) + U[P(R)I(T  -  R) 
(41) 
Since the utility is identical for all workers, expected utility is also equal to 
this representative utility. As can be seen from equation (41),  expected 
utility increases with P(R0). 
The pension payments are chosen to rise just fast enough to keep work- 
ers from retiring until they are disabled. There is also a maximum retire- 
ment age, R*. Because pensions are constant from R* onward, at age R*, 
all remaining workers will choose to retire, disabled or not. The budget 
constraint requires that the cost of the pensions, BIP(Ro),R*],  must equal 
the pension savings, S, where 
(42)  + IZP(R)(T -  R)h(R)dR 
U(W)(Ro - Yo) + U[P(Ro)](T  -  Ro). 
B[P(Ro),  R*l = H(Ro)P(Ro)(T  -  Ro) 
+ [l -  H(R*)]P(R*)(T  -  R*). 
The choice of R* leads to an Ro,  which in turn determines expected util- 
ity. Recall that P(R)  is determined by the initial conditions and equation 
(40)  * 
(43)  Wo)  + s,”  { WWl - U(W))/{  U’ [K41(7-  -  x)}dxt 
’  RosRsR* 
PW*)  R > R* 
aB[P(Ro),  R*]/aP(Ro)  > 0.  r 
P(R)  = 
Increasing P(R0)  raises P(R)  for R between Ro  and R*.  Hence, the cost of 
an increase in P(R0)  is unambiguously positive. 
(44) 
It is possible to increase P(R0)  and satisfy the budget constraint only so 
long as aB[P(Ro),  R*]/aR* < 0,  where 
(45)  aBIP(Ro)’  R*l  = [l -  H(R*)][P’(R*)(T  -  R*) -  P(R*)] 
aR* 
[1 -  H(R*)]{U[P(R*)]  - U(W) -  P(R*)U’[P(R*)]} 
U’ [P  W*)I 
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To maximize P(Ro),  the optimal choice of R* occurs at the unique solu- 
tion” to aB/aR* = 0, 
(47)  U[P(R*)]  - U(W) -  P(R*)U’[P(R*)]  = 0. 
Because pensions rise with retirement age, workers receive less than per- 
fect insurance. Workers who are disabled later benefit at the expense of 
those who must retire early. On the other hand, theorem 3 still applies; 
pensions rise more slowly than is actuarially fair. 
Right at the maximum retirement age, R*, there is no longer any ad- 
verse selection and pensions rise exactly at the actuarially fair rate. From 
equation (46), P‘(R*)  = P(R*)/(T -  R*).  A comparison of second de- 
rivativesI6  shows that the actuarially fair curve is steeper than P(R)  for re- 
tirement before R*. Second-best pensions must be as illustrated in figure 
10.5. 
As an  example of the second-best solution, consider workers who arrive 
at age 60 each with 60 units of pension savings. Life span is known to be 
exactly 20 years. The probability of  disability is uniform between ages 60 
and 80. While the individual works, his wages are 2. Utility is logarithmic 
and there is no disutility from work until disabled. The first-best pension 
plan (when disabilities are verifiable) offers an annual benefit of  5.4 to 
disabled workers and permits everyone to retire after 13.67 years. When 
disabilities are unobservable,  the constrained optimal pension offers an 
annual benefit of  3.3 for retirement at age 60 and rises exponentially to a 
maximal payment of 5.4 for retirement at age 70. Between ages 60 and 70, 
only disabled workers retire; at age 70, all remaining workers retire. 
R 
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The problem becomes more complicated if, as might be expected, dis- 
utility (perhaps due to illness) is negatively correlated with life expectancy. 
The expected cost of offering a pension plan will be greater than in the 
case where retirement decisions and life expectancy are unrelated. This 
phenomenon is referred to as adverse correlation. The effect of adverse 
correlation may be of actuarial advantage to late-retiring cohorts. 
An interesting area of speculation concerns the role played by the distri- 
bution of disability dates. In an optimal plan, the relative rewards to indi- 
viduals retiring at ages 65 and 70 may depend on the sizes of  those two 
groups. Yet the sizes of the two groups could hardly have anything to do 
with actuarial fairness. Workers who are disabled early may have relative- 
ly lower pensions to counter the problem of adverse selection. If these ear- 
ly retirees received an actuarially fair pension, large numbers of relatively 
healthy workers might prefer early retirement, an outcome which is not 
feasible. The distortion away from the first-best solution is greater for 
young retirees than for old retirees; favorable early retirement options 
create moral hazard problems for a relatively large number of workers 
while favorable late retirement options have little adverse effect on work- 
ers who had to retire early. 
10.4  Merged Pensions and Strict Pareto Inferiority 
A major theme of  informational economics is that inefficiencies are 
generated when individuals with differing characteristics are treated alike. 
The equal treatment may result from a regulatory requirement or an in- 
ability to distinguish between workers’ characteristics. Despite the overall 
inefficiency, one group usually benefits at the expense of the other. High- 
risk drivers benefit when they are lumped in the pool with low-risk driv- 
ers. Under ERISA, all companies are charged the same premium for in- 
surance; this helps the poorly funded pension plan at the expense of  the 
well funded. 
The effects of  pooling are of  considerable importance in  retirement 
plans. The government is becoming increasingly involved in legislation in 
this  area.  Raising the  permissible mandatory  retirement  age creates  a 
problem of separating populations that did not previously need to be sep- 
arated. Presently, there is serious discussion about eliminating all manda- 
tory retirement  ages.  Legislation that requires pensions to be constant 
across a firm becomes more significant with the growth of conglomerates. 
When two disparate firms merge, there is a tendency to integrate towards 
the more generous pension plan, in part because of  contractual obliga- 
tion. The issue is perhaps most salient with regard to discussion of altering 
pension programs, which at present frequently differ by sex.” As workers 
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neat solution to the social security problem. There will be an inevitable 
tug-of-war between the white-collar workers who want to work into their 
later years and the blue-collar workers who want to retire as soon as possi- 
ble. Interestingly, both groups might be better off if each were able to  have 
a plan of its own. 
What is the cost of combining two pension plans? This question cannot 
be answered in general, for it depends on how the workers vary. To sim- 
plify, consider a company with two groups of workers, A and B.  One Pa- 
reto optimal outcome will have the preferred pension for group A;  call it 
P*(A),  and likewise for B and P*(B).  The constraint is that each of these 
contracts must be chosen from among those that break even. Assume for 
further simplification that there is no variability within groups. 
There is no loss in combining the plans if the A’s prefer P*(A)  to P*(B) 
and the B’s prefer P*(B).  Our experience with insurance models suggests 
that this may not be the case. If, as U.S. law requires, the two groups are 
merged  under  a common  pension  offering both  plans,  the A’s might 
choose P*(B).  This leads to a problem since P*(B)  is not achievable when 
used by both A and B type workers. The general solution under such cir- 
cumstances is to alter P*(B),  making it less attractive to the A’s until they 
just choose their  own plan (see Nichols and Zeckhauser  1982). At the 
same time, the plan for the A’s need not be self-supporting; there can be a 
cross-subsidy to the plan intended to attract the A’s.  If so, we  may get a 
pair made up of a somewhat distorted P*(B)  that makes money and a sub- 
sidized P*(A).” 
The pension problem is considerably more complex than the standard 
area of  application of  information  economics. It leads to qualitatively 
new phenomena. It is quite possible that the optimal plan for A’s in isola- 
tion will be chosen by the B’s and that the preferred plan for the B’s in iso- 
lation will be chosen by A’s.  If so, both groups may suffer losses from the 
merger of their pension funds. This is demonstrated below. 
Two companies with different type of employees have each worked out 
their own optimal pension plan. A11  contributions have already been made 
and the per capita funds in the two plans are equal at 3/2 per worker. 
There are two periods remaining. The employees of the two firms have the 
common expected utility function 
(48)  EU = U(C,)  + psU(C2) -  D’(L), 
where C, = consumption in periods  i,  i = (1,  2), ps = the probability 
of survival in the second period, L = the first-period labor supply, either 
0 if  retired or  1  if working, D(L) = the disutility of  work, D(0) = 0, 
i = (1, 2). The functional form of the utility function is the same for all 
employees. It  is concave, hence risk averse, and is  illustrated  in figure 
10.6. 310  Barry Nalebuff/Richard J. Zeckhauser 
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U(c)  = -c  > -  . 
The employees of company A have the following characteristics 
ps = -  ;OA(l) = 3/5;  marginal  product = 0.  1 
2  (50) 
Since their marginal product is zero, it is optimal for them to retire imme- 
diately. With their accumulated pension savings of  1 '/2 units per capita, 
the optimal plan yields 
(51)  G=1;  G=l 
1  1 
2  2 
EUA = U(1) + -  U(1) -  D(0) = 1 -  .  (52) 
Note that this is also actuarially feasible, since the expected total pension 
=  + pSG  = 1 1/,  which is the original accumulated pension savings. 
The employees of company B have the characteristics 
(53)  ps  = 1; P(1)  = 5/4;  marginal  product = 3/2. 
Here, the optimal strategy for a B employee is to work in the first period, 
retire in the second. He receives 
(54)  = 3/2;  = 312 311  Pensions and the Retirement Decision 
EUB = U(3/2)  + U(3/2) -  P(1) = 1 2. 
4  (55) 
This consumption pattern is also actuarially supportable, since expect- 
ed totalconsumption  = C + pSG  = 3 = total pensionsavings  + mar- 
ginal product. 
Now assume that the two pension plans are merged. Who will benefit 
and who will  lose? First, notice that if  offered the opportunity, any A 
would prefer B’s pension plan to his own. That is, he would work in the 
first period if by doing so he could earn a consumption stream of 3/2,3/2. 
This yields 
1  13 
20 
EU’  = U(3/2)  + -j-  U(3/2) - P(1)  = 1 -  .  (56) 
And, somewhat surprisingly, B would prefer A’s plan. B would retire in 
the first period with a consumption stream of  1,l. 
(57)  EUB = U(1)  + U(1)  = 2. 
The comparisons are as follows: 
ExDected Utilitv 
A  B 
l2  IT-  A’s plan 
B’s plan  13  3 
‘20  IT 
This paradoxical situation arises only when A’s pension program is not 
supportable if B’s comprise the population, and B’s is not supportable if 
A’s comprise the population. The difficulty  is that any program that gets 
the productive  B’s  to work  will also induce the nonproductive A’s  to 
work; if the low life expectancy A’s retire, the B’s will also retire. 
The choice for the merged pension plan is to have both groups retire or 
to have both groups work in the first period. Given this constraint, there 
exists no pension plan that breaks even and offers either group a situation 
as favorable as the one with which it started. 
Let there be equal numbers of A’s and B’s, normalized to one for each 
group. Assume that both retire early. There is a total of three units of pen- 
sion savings. Given that V(C)  = -  00 for C  < 1, we must have CI = C2  = 1. 
But this consumption program will take 1 ‘/2 units of consumption for A 
and 2 for B. It is infeasible. Any plan that induces both individuals to re- 
tire in the first period must offer each of them a lower expected utility than 
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Consider now plans that induce both A and B to work for one period. 
The total resources available will be 3 of pension savings plus  1  % from 
B’s production, which equals 4%. The first-best outcome for B is to re- 
ceive a consumption stream of 3/2,3/2, since additional consumption of- 
fers no utility.  But this consumption stream is not supportable for the 
combined groups, because A would require 3/2 in the first period and his 
probability of survival, 1/2, times 3/2 in the second, totaling 2%. Adding 
to B’s requirement of 3, the required resources are 5 %, but only 4% is 
available. 
The best supportable consumption stream for A is 3/2,  1. (Both A and 
B get 3/2 in the first period. A gets an expectation of 1/2 in the second pe- 
riod while B gets l). But since A’s disutility of work is 3/5, he too must 
lose from a merged pension plan where both work. 
The conclusion is that all pension plans for the merged group leave both 
parties strictly worse off than they were in isolation. This demonstration 
was facilitated by having a utility function with vertical and horizontal 
segments, but the possibility for a counterexample is general and could be 
created for a utility function with continuous curvature. 
A policy conclusion emerges from this demonstration. Considerations 
of risk spreading and equity have been used as arguments for homogeniz- 
ing pension programs across different types of workers and firms. Some- 
times the restrictions  are specific: the pension  plans must be the same. 
Other times regulatory impositions, such as some of those associated with 
ERISA, encourage conformity. This example shows that it is important to 
ask whether the imposition of “equal treatment” in retirement programs 
may hurt many or most if not a11.I9 
10.5  Conclusions 
Labor markets are quite different from the markets studied in introduc- 
tory textbooks. The products sold are heterogeneous, substantial uncer- 
tainties are compounded by asymmetric information flow, and interde- 
pendencies in “sales”  may extend across several periods because of such 
matters  as training  and proprietary  information. Given such  complex- 
ities, secure contracting possibilities and flexible reward  schedules (i.e., 
prices that depend on outcome,) would be particularly desirable. Howev- 
er, rules and standards against indenturing limit possibilities  in the first 
area. The second is constrained by a variety of institutions that limit wage 
flexibility, and by quite considerable risk aversion on the part of sellers in 
the market (i.e., the workers). 
Pensions are a powerful instrument for compensating labor. They may 
be able to facilitate labor market  operations. They offer several signifi- 
cant advantages: awarded late in life, pensions can be based on extensive 
performance; they are granted in periods to which workers might wish to 
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in a reward structure that can depend on such factors as salary, age, and 
years of service. 
The purpose of this analysis was to provide a framework for examining 
the effects of pensions on retirement decisions. At least since the 1920s, 
the advantages of pensions as a mechanism for securing the retirement of 
workers whose productivity is falling have been understood and applied. 
This feature is likely to become more important with the passage of time 
for at least three reasons: (1) individuals are living longer; (2) as the work- 
place becomes more technologically sophisticated, the dangers of techno- 
logical obsolescence of older workers become more pronounced; and (3) 
both overtly, as through legislation, and implicitly, society is increasing its 
“protection” of workers who might not choose to retire. The recent con- 
gressional decision to raise the mandatory retirement age of private sector 
workers to 70 has now been extended to state and local government em- 
ployees. Age discrimination  suits associated with layoffs and dismissals 
have become relatively commonplace. There is talk, indeed, about abol- 
ishing mandatory retirement provisions altogether. 
We have begun by focusing on the factors that induce individuals to re- 
tire. The first model incorporates the qualitative features of  most defined 
benefit pension plans in the United States and inquires how such plans can 
be employed to induce optimal retirement decisions. Pensions are viewed 
as a form of forced saving whose purpose is to enable the worker to “com- 
mit himself” by making it in his own self-interest to retire at an appropri- 
ate age. 
The remaining models examine the use of pensions in populations that 
are heterogeneous with respect to such features as disutility of work or ex- 
pected life span. Given heterogeneity, a major policy concern is whether 
pensions are actuarially fair to different groups, retirement cohorts, and 
so on. An optimal pension plan cannot be actuarially “more than fair,” in 
the sense that someone who retires later must impose a smaller cost on the 
pension pool than he would if he retired earlier. However, people who re- 
tire later are likely on average to live longer. Under most common pension 
plans, late retirees impose a greater cost on the pension fund than those re- 
tiring earlier. 
In a first-best world, a separate pension plan would be designed for 
each group of workers. (Conceivably there would be lump-sum transfers 
among plans. They need only break even as a whole.) However, govern- 
ment-mandated retirement programs, legislation regulating private pen- 
sion programs, and the forced common form of pension programs within 
single firms are powerful forces for homogenization.  Such homogeniza- 
tion is shown to work to the possible detriment of workers as a whole. 
Pensions are a workhorse compensation mechanism, meeting a variety 
of objectives in labor market operations and dealing with a range of im- 
perfections and contracting difficulties. This analysis has focused on the 
ideal use of pensions to facilitate appropriate retirement decisions. The 314  Barry Nalebuff/Richard .I.  Zeckhauser 
challenge both for conceptual work and for policy is to design pensions 
that blend the objectives of attracting, sorting, motivating, and retaining 
workers with the need to  induce reasonable retirement choices. 
Appendix 
Pension BeneJits and Retirement Age 
A survey of noncontributory pension plans from 75 United States com- 
panies revealed several patterns about the general structure of private pen- 
sions in this country.  These companies,  which  had  businesses ranging 
from communications and insurance to manufacturing and mining, all 
had prescribed minimum requirements at least for the age of retirement 
and often for the years of service as well. Benefits were calculated on a 
monthly basis in each case, the most common formulas multiplying the 
years of service by a set dollar figure or by a percentage of salary. While 
most companies utilized the standard retirement age of 65 as the mini- 
mum requirement, several allowed retirement at 62 or even 60. Often the 
workers were given an option of retiring, for instance, at 65 with 10 years 
of service or at 60 with 30 years of service. It thus becomes difficult to 
classify the retirement ages encouraged by pensions. 
The benefit formulas ranged from the exceedingly simple to the bewil- 
deringly  complex.  Many companies offer the employees the option of 
choosing among several formulas that take into account, among other 
things, years of service, average monthly pay over the last five years, and 
future social security benefits. Others simply multiplied the years of  ser- 
vice the worker had put in with the firm times a set dollar amount. Most of 
them, whether simple or complex, incorporate either a set dollar amount 
or a percentage of salary, multiplied times the years of service. A typical 
plan might offer the worker a monthly benefit of his years of service mul- 
tiplied times either $15 or 1.5% of final monthly earnings. Extra percent- 
ages were offered by a few companies to  workers with 30 or more years of 
service. The number of  variables in the benefits formula make it difficult 
to  directly compare benefit payments across companies. 
All of the pension plans incorporate an early retirement option that al- 
lows the workers to retire before the prescribed minimum age, while im- 
posing a penalty if they want payment before they reach the normal retire- 
ment age. These penalties usually deduct a set percentage of the pension 
for each year that the employee retired early. Many companies take into 
account other factors such as years of service; the early retirement penalty 
thus varies across workers, Forty-six of the companies surveyed utilized a 
uniform percentage reduction system. These penalties ranged from 3% to 
7% for every year under the prescribed age; most were between 4%  and 
5%. If an employee retired at age 60 when the minimum retirement age 315  Pensions and the Retirement Decision 
was 65 and a 5% per year penalty was imposed, that worker would receive 
75% of the benefit he would normally receive. In a few cases, the penalties 
are scaled down when early retirement occurs within three years of the 
normal retirement age. 
Notes 
1. The union attempted to counter these employer-sponsored plans by instituting inde- 
pendent pension plans of  their own. While the firms concentrated on providing future old 
age benefits, the unions initially offered only general benefit programs; immediate benefits 
for sickness, disability, death, and strikes appealed more to the younger workers they were 
trying to attract. They gradually expanded the scope of  program benefits and soon focused 
primarily on old age payments. By  1928, about 40% of  union members belonged to national 
unions offering one form or another of  old age benefits. These pensions were funded by as- 
sessments on union members, and they became increasingly burdensome as the number of 
older workers increased. Raising union dues became more difficult, especially with the ad- 
vent of the Depression. Other demands on the unions’ treasuries, combined with the nation’s 
financial chaos, resulted in the almost complete collapse of all union welfare plans by the 
early 1930s. After social security was adopted in 1935 only a handful of  union plans sur- 
vived, and it was not until the Second World War that union interest in pensions revived. 
2. At present, this is done through the Supplemental Security Income program. 
3.  Pensions can also provide an effective wage adjustment if they are actuarially unfair 
to workers who postpone retirement (Lazear, in this vol.). However, as discussed later, pen- 
sions that appear unfair may only be a reflection of the heterogeneous life spans in the popu- 
lation. 
4.  As discussed earlier, there are tax advantages for savings in pensions. These deferred 
taxes result, all other things equal, in an effectively lower discount rate for savings held by 
the firm. This provides an additional argument for pensions. 
5. Larger pensions increase workers’ forced savings. To raise savings in equilibrium, we 
must assume that workers cannot fully counter this effect by borrowing against their pension 
to restore current consumption. We assume that there is no borrowing act of this sort. 
6.  Bulow (1981) demonstrates that workers who retire early should take advantage of the 
early retirement  option rather than wait until the normal retirement age before collecting 
benefits. 
7.  If inflation were recognized in the design of the pension plan, and if it were constant, 
all calculations using real dollars would pertain. Given that most pension plans deal in mini- 
mal dollars, variable inflation rates impose risk costs on the worker unless inflation indexa- 
tion is perfect and immediate. 
8. One theoretical solution to this problem would be to stop paying pensions after 20 
years of retirement. Indeed, some plans allow the workers to take the pension’s actuarial val- 
ue in a lump sum payment. If this were required rather than an option, workers with longer 
life spans would have less incentive to take advantage of early retirement provisions. 
9.  This problem  is complicated  if,  as is common, the pension plan gives a surviving 
spouse a substantial fraction of the worker’s benefits. The problem will be mitigated if vari- 
ability in expected benefits is less once spouse’s benefits are included. We  do not consider 
survivors’ benefit in this analysis, leaving for the future such interesting questions as the cor- 
relation among life expectancies of worker and his spouse (i.e., do young women seek as hus- 
bands older workers with high pensions offering survivor clauses?) or the extent to which 
workers take into account when making retirement  decisions the welfare of their spouse 
after their own death. 
10.  In conventional plans this may be some average of final-year wages. In pattern plans, 
the function would be a constant. 
11.  In theory, the corporation could make a contract for the way it treats the work force as 
a whole. For example, it could commit itself to have no more than 25% early retirements. An 
alternative means of allowing for differential treatment, yet providing adherence to earlier 
contracts, is to  offer to pay someone (not necessarily the worker) an amount that depends on 316  Barry Nalebuff/Richard J. Zeckhauser 
the action that is taken relative to the worker. This latter case simply creates a mechanism to 
make the contract self-enforcing. 
12. Cooper (1983) nicely categorizes some general properties of  the optimal second-best 
solutions in problems with adverse selection or moral hazard when the agents' preferences 
obey SCP. 
13. Disabilities do shorten life spans. Models of pensions with heterogeneous life expec- 
tancies are considered in the previous section. 
14. Workers who are disabled before the minimum retirement date stop working but do 
not start collecting pensions until age Ro. 
15. For small values of R, aB/aR is negative. To see that there is a unique solution to 
aB/aR* = 0, observe from eq. (45') that at any solution to aB/aR = 0, the second deriva- 
tive c~~B/~R*~  = -  U" [P(R*)]P'  (R*)(T-  R)/U'  [P(R)]',  which is positive. 
16.  The second derivative of the actuarially fair curve is P" = 2P' /( T- R)  while the curve 
that keeps workers indifferent about retirement  age has a larger second derivative, P" = 
2P'/(T- R) - II"P'2/U'.  Since the curves are tangent at R*,  the actuarially fair curve must 
lie below the indifference curve for R <  R*. 
17.  In 1983, the Supreme Court in Arizona Governing Committee v.  Norris held that for 
tax-deferred compensation plans, the monthly retirement benefits cannot be lower to wom- 
en who made the same contributions as men. 
18. Such a subsidy is not possible in a competitive market in which the A's and B's can be 
distinguished.. A firm could make positive profits by offering only the P(B)  plan and not 
hiring and A type workers. 
19.  Negative outcomes of this type are particularly  likely if  other aspects of the labor 
packages get adjusted to take account of retirement packages. If so, there might be a pre- 
sumption that any attempt to eliminate distinctions in retirement programs that promote in- 
efficiency  would work to the detriment of all. 
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